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We propose a new coherent state quantum key distribution protocol that eliminates the need to randomly
switch between measurement bases. This protocol provides significantly higher secret key rates with increased
bandwidths than previous schemes that only make single quadrature measurements. It also offers the further
advantage of simplicity compared to all previous protocols which, to date, have relied on switching.
Quantum cryptography is the science of sending secret
messages via a quantum channel. It uses properties of quan-
tum mechanics [1, 2] to establish a secure key, a process
known as quantum key distribution (QKD) [3]. This key can
then be used to send encrypted information. In a generic QKD
protocol, a sender (Alice) prepares quantum states which are
sent to a receiver (Bob) through a potentially noisy chan-
nel. Alice and Bob agree on a set of non-commuting bases
to measure the states with. Using various reconciliation [4]
and privacy amplification [5] procedures, the results of mea-
surements in these bases are used to construct a secret key,
known only to Alice and Bob. Switching randomly between a
pair of non-commuting measurement bases ensures security:
in a direct attack, an eavesdropper (Eve) will only choose the
correct basis half the time; alternatively, if Eve uses quantum
memory and performs her measurements after Bob declares
his basis, she is unable to manipulate what Bob measures. It
is commonly assumed that randomly switching between mea-
surement bases is crucial to the success of QKD protocols. In
this Letter we show that this is not the case, and in fact greater
secret key rates can be achieved by simultaneously measuring
both bases.
The original QKD schemes in the discrete variable regime
were based on the transmission and measurement of random
polarizations of single photon states [2]. Other discrete vari-
able QKD protocols have been proposed [6] and experimen-
tally demonstrated [7] using Bell states. However the band-
width of such schemes is experimentally limited by single
photon generation and detection techniques. Consequently in
the last few years there has been considerable interest in the
field of continuous variable quantum cryptography [8], which
provides an alternative to the discrete approach and promises
higher key rates. Continuous variable QKD protocols have
been proposed for squeezed and Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen en-
tangled states [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. However, these protocols re-
quire significant quantum resources and are susceptible to de-
coherence due to losses. QKD protocols using coherent states
were proposed to overcome these limitations. Originally such
schemes were only secure for line losses less than 50% or 3dB
[14]. This apparent limitation was overcome using the secret
key distillation techniques of post-selection [15] and reverse
reconciliation [16].
In general, security in discrete variable cryptography proto-
cols is ensured via random switching between measurement
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FIG. 1: (a) Schematic of the simultaneous quadrature measurement
protocol. S±: random Gaussian numbers, AM: amplitude modu-
lator, PM: phase modulator, Xˆ±A : quadratures of Alice’s prepared
state, η: channel transmission, Nˆ±: channel noise, Xˆ±B : observables
that Bob measures and Nˆ±B : Bob’s vacuum noise. (b) Schematic
of a possible feed forward attack for Eve. Xˆ±E : observables that Eve
measures, Nˆ±E1 and Nˆ
±
E2: Eve’s vacuum noises, g
±
E : Eve’s electronic
gains andN±: additional Gaussian noise.
bases [2] or random switching of state manipulation [17].
The random switching between measurement bases can be
achieved simply via a 50/50 beam splitter, where the selec-
tion of the measurement basis is chosen through the random
photon transmission and reflection statistics. To date all con-
tinuous variable cryptography protocols have also relied on
randomly switching between non-commuting bases. In the
continuous variable regime, switching requires precise con-
trol of the phase of a local oscillator beam, which is difficult
to achieve in practice. This local oscillator switching currently
places a serious technical limitation on the bandwidth of cryp-
tography protocols. In this Letter, we introduce a new coher-
ent state protocol that does not require switching. In this pro-
tocol, both bases are measured simultaneously, utilizing the
quantum channel more effectively and achieving both higher
secret key rates and bandwidths compared to previous contin-
uous variable QKD protocols.
The quantum states we consider in this letter can be de-
scribed using the field annihilation operator aˆ = (Xˆ+ +
iXˆ−)/2, which is expressed in terms of the amplitude Xˆ+
and phase Xˆ− quadrature operators. In this paper, we denote
2operators and real numbers with and without (ˆ), respectively,
to avoid confusion. Without a loss of generality, the quadra-
ture operators can be expressed in terms of a steady state and
fluctuating component as Xˆ± = 〈Xˆ±〉+ δXˆ±, which have
variances of V ±= 〈(δXˆ±)2〉. Figure 1(a) shows a schematic
of our protocol, which we term the simultaneous quadrature
measurement protocol. Our scheme is similar to the contin-
uous variable coherent state quantum cryptography protocols
presented in [14]. The protocol goes as follows: Alice draws
two random real numbers S+ and S− from Gaussian distri-
butions with zero mean and a variance of V ±S . She then pre-
pares a state by displacing the amplitude and phase quadra-
tures of a vacuum state by S+ and S−, respectively. The
quadrature operators of Alice’s state are therefore given by
Xˆ±A = S±+Xˆ±v , where Xˆ±v are the quadrature operators of
the initial vacuum state. The resulting state has normalized
quadrature variances of V ±A = V
±
S + 1. Alice transmits this
state to Bob through a quantum channel with channel trans-
mission efficiency η, which couples in channel noise Nˆ±,
where the variances of the channel noise must obey the un-
certainty relation V +N V
−
N ≥ 1. Bob simultaneously measures
the amplitude and phase quadratures of the state using a 50/50
beam splitter. The quadrature variances of the state measured
by Bob are given by
V ±B =
1
2
(
ηV ±A + (1− η)V ±N + 1
)
(1)
By using secret key distillations protocols [4] and standard
privacy amplification techniques [5], Alice and Bob can then
distill a common secret key. It is possible to analyze our pro-
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FIG. 2: Contour plot of the information rate for the simultaneous
quadrature measurement protocol as a function of channel efficiency
η and channel noise VN in units of (bits/symbol) for VA = 100.
tocol using either the post-selection, or reverse reconciliation,
secret key distillation techniques [15, 16]. However, for sim-
plicity, we limit our analysis to the Grosshans and Grangier
reverse reconciliation protocol [16]. In this protocol, Alice
and Eve both try to infer Bob’s measurement results. Al-
ice’s inference can be characterized by a conditional variance
which is used to calculate the secret key rate. Alice’s con-
ditional variance given Bob’s measurement can be written as
V ±
A|B = ming±
A
〈(Xˆ±B − g±AXˆ±A )2〉, where the gain g±A is opti-
mized to give a minimum conditional variance of
V ±
A|B = V
±
B − |〈Xˆ±A Xˆ±B 〉|2/V ±A (2)
To calculate a relation between Alice’s and Eve’s conditional
variances of Bob’s measurement, V ±
E|B and V
±
A|B , we de-
fine the states that denote Alice’s and Eve’s inference of
Bob’s measurement, expressed as: Xˆ±
E|B = Xˆ
±
B − αXˆ±E and
Xˆ∓
A|B = Xˆ
∓
B − βXˆ∓A where βXˆ±A and αXˆ±E are Alice and
Eve’s optimal estimates with the optimal gains, α and β being
real numbers. Finding the commutator of these two equations,
and using the fact that different Hilbert spaces commute, we
find that [Xˆ+
E|B, Xˆ
−
A|B] = [Xˆ
+
B , Xˆ
−
B ] = 2i [16]. This leads to
the joint Heisenberg uncertainty relation
V ±
E|BV
∓
A|B ≥ 1 (3)
Therefore, there is a limit to what Alice and Eve can know
simultaneously about what Bob has measured. From this in-
equality it is possible to determine the maximum information
Eve can obtain about the state in terms of Alice’s conditional
variances V ±
A|B .
To minimize Alice’s conditional variance for one of Bob’s
measurements, Alice can prepare and send squeezed states,
instead of coherent states. In this case, the quadrature variance
of the states prepared by Alice are given by V ±A = V
±
S +V
±
sqz,
where V ±sqz denote the quadrature variances of the squeezed
state, and clearly V ±sqz ≥ 1/V ∓A . Using Eqs. (1) and (2) we
determine Alice’s conditional variance to be
V ±
A|B =
1
2
(
ηV ±sqz + (1− η)V ±N + 1
)
(4)
To find a lower bound on Eve’s conditional variances, we
first consider her inference of Bob’s state prior to the 50/50
beam splitter in his station. This is given by V ±
E|B′ =
ming±
E
〈(Xˆ±B′ − g′±E Xˆ±E )2〉, where ′ labels Bob’s state prior to
the beam splitter, and g′±E is chosen to minimize V
±
E|B′ . Eve’s
measurement variance after the beam splitter conditioned on
Bob’s measurement, V ±
E|B , can be expressed in terms of the
conditional variance before the beam splitter, V ±
E|B′ , as
V ±
E|B = ming±
E
〈(Xˆ±B − g±EXˆ±E )2〉
=
1
2
(V ±
E|B′ + 1) (5)
where we have used the fact that Eve has no access to the beam
splitter in Bob’s station, and therefore has no knowledge of the
vacuum entering through it. The minimum conditional vari-
ance achievable by Alice, prior to the beam splitter in Bob’s
station, is V ±
A|B′(min) = η/V
±
A + (1 − η)V ±N [16]. Using
3this fact, and the conditional variance inequality in Eq. (3),
we can establish a lower bound on Eve’s inferences of Bob’s
measurements
V ±E|B(min) ≥
1
2
(( η
V ±A
+ (1− η)V ±N
)−1
+ 1
)
. (6)
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FIG. 3: Net information rates for the simultaneous and single quadra-
ture measurement schemes as a function of channel efficiency. (i)
Dashed line, simultaneous quadrature measurement. (ii) Dot dashed
line, single quadrature measurement. (iii) Solid line, simultaneous
quadrature measurement with feed forward attack. For a variance of
VA = 100 with varying channel noise: (a) VN=1 (b) VN=1.2 and
(c) VN=2.
The optimal information rate at which a Gaussian signal can
be transmitted though a channel with additive Gaussian noise
is given by the Shannon formula [18], which can be expressed
as I = 1/2 log2
(
1+S/N
)
with units of (bits/symbol), where
S/N is the standard signal to noise ratio. This optimal net in-
formation rate can be used to determine the secret key rate for
our simultaneous quadrature measurement protocol, which is
given by ∆I = ∆I+ + ∆I−, where ∆I± = I±BA − I±BE
with IBA(BE) being the quadrature information rates be-
tween Bob and Alice (Eve): I±BA =1/2log2
(
V ±B /V
±
A|B
)
and
I±BE=1/2log2
(
V ±B /V
±
E|B
) [16]. From these expressions, the
secret key rate for the simultaneous quadrature measurement
protocol can be expressed as
∆I =
1
2
log2
(V +
E|BV
−
E|B
V +
A|BV
−
A|B
)
(7)
where the generation of a secret key is only possible when ∆I
is greater than zero. Substituting Eq. (4) with V ±sqz = 1 (Alice
maximizes her information rate by using coherent states), and
Eq. (6) into Eq. (7), gives a lower bound on the secret key rate
of
∆I ≥ log2
( ( η
VA
+ (1− η)VN )−1 + 1
η + (1 − η)VN + 1
)
(8)
where we have assumed symmetry between the amplitude and
phase quadratures. Figure 2 shows the secret key rate for the
simultaneous quadrature measurement scheme as a function
of channel efficiency and channel noise. We see that, so long
as the channel noise VN is not excessive, a secret key can be
successfully generated between Alice and Bob, even in the
limit of very small channel efficiency η. As the channel noise
is reduced, or efficiency increased, the rate at which a key can
be established is enhanced. Figure 3 compares the information
rates of the simultaneous and single quadrature protocols as a
function of channel efficiency for varying channel noise. The
information rate for simultaneous quadrature measurements is
always higher than that for single quadrature measurements,
and in the limit of large signal variances and high channel ef-
ficiency, it approaches double. The individual secret key rates
for the simultaneous and single quadrature measurement pro-
tocols can be calculated and are plotted in Fig. (4). It should
be noted that in our protocol Eve must attempt to determine
Bob’s measurements in both the amplitude and phase quadra-
tures. This introduces an extra penalty to Eve, which is not
included in the lower bound for her conditional variance in
Eq. (6). Therefore, in general, Eve will do even worse than
our analysis suggests.
To establish an upper bound on the secret key rate, we now
consider the physical implementation of an eavesdropping at-
tack for Eve for our protocol. In the case where Bob measures
a single quadrature, Grosshans and Grangier showed that an
entangling cloner attack [16] is the optimum attack. However,
for simultaneous quadrature measurements, we found a more
effective attack to be a simple feed forward attack with no en-
tanglement as shown in Fig. 1 (b). The attack goes as follows:
Eve taps off a fraction of the beam using a beam splitter with
transmission ǫ. She performs simultaneous quadrature mea-
surements on this beam, with measured quadrature variances
of
V ±E =
1
2
(
(1− ǫ)V ±A + ǫ+ 1
)
(9)
She then applies the measured photocurrents back onto the
quantum channel using electronic feed forward techniques.
The variances of Bob’s measurements can then be expressed
as
V ±B =
1
2
((√
ǫ+ g±E
√
(1− ǫ)/2
)2
V ±A + 1 (10)
+ V ±N + g
2±
E /2 +
(√
1− ǫ+ g±E
√
ǫ/2
)2)
where g±E is the gain of the electric feed forward, and to avoid
detection Eve encodes additional Gaussian noise with a vari-
ance V ±N onto the channel. The gain of Eve’s feed forward
must be chosen carefully to ensure that the magnitude of the
signal detected by Bob remains invariant. The correct gain
can be expressed as g±E =
√
2(
√
η − √ǫ)/√1− ǫ. Substi-
tuting this into Eq. (10) we obtain Bob’s variance due to the
feed forward attack, V ff±B . We can now calculate Eve’s con-
ditional variance, V ff±
E|B , for the feed forward attack as a func-
tion of the beam splitter transmission ǫ. Ideally, Eve would
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FIG. 4: Information rates for the simultaneous and single quadrature
measurement schemes as a function of channel efficiency η, with
V ±A = 100 and V
±
N =1. The net information rate for both schemes
is ∆I = IBA−IBE . In the case of simultaneous quadrature mea-
surements, IBE , the dashed line, denotes maximum information rate
obtained by Eve, whilst IffBE . the dot dashed line, denotes the infor-
mation rate obtained by Eve using the feed forward attack.
take ǫ→ 0 to gain as much information about Alice’s signal as
possible. However, in doing so she increases the noise on Al-
ice’s inference of Bob’s state and consequently alerts them to
her presence. She must ensure that her attack does not change
the magnitude of this noise. This places both lower ǫmin and
upper ǫmax limits on the beam splitter transmission. We nu-
merically minimize V ff±
E|B for all ǫ between ǫmin and ǫmax, and
hence determine the secret key rate ∆Iff . The secret key rate
for the feed forward attack is plotted in Figs. (3) and (4), and
compared with the lower bound calculated in Eq. (8). Fig-
ure (3) shows that for channel noise of variance VN = 1, the
feed forward information rate is higher than our lower bound.
However, as the channel noise variance is slighty increased,
the feed forward bound asymptotes to the lower bound calcu-
lated in Eq. (8).
To summarize, we have proposed a new coherent state
QKD protocol based on simultaneous quadrature measure-
ments. We have calculated a lower bound on the secret key
rate for this protocol, finding that in the limit of large signal
variance and high channel efficiency it approaches twice that
of previous coherent state QKD schemes. We have considered
a possible eavesdropping attack in the form of a simple feed
forward scheme, which has provided us with an upper bound
on the secret key rate. An important advantage of our simulta-
neous quadrature measurement protocol is the increase in to-
tal bandwidth. The absolute information rate, in bits/second,
can be expressed as I = W log2(1 + S/N) [18], where W is
the limiting bandwidth associated with the state preparation or
detection. Typically, in continuous variable quantum cryptog-
raphy schemes, W can be attributed to the switching time for
the local oscillator phase. The simultaneous quadrature mea-
surement scheme does not require switching, so that orders
of magnitude increases in absolute secret key rates should be
achievable.
In conclusion, we have shown that there is no need to ran-
domly switch bases to achieve secure QKD. By performing
simultaneous quadrature measurements in a coherent state
quantum cryptography protocol, we are able to achieve a sig-
nificantly larger secret key rate than that obtained by the usual
single quadrature measurements. This new QKD protocol will
allow simpler and higher bandwidth quantum cryptographic
experiments and technological applications.
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